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Abstract This paper examines the process that drives the formation and evolution
of disclosure regulations. In equilibrium, changes in the regulation depend on the
status quo, standard-setters’ political accountability and underlying objectives, and
the cost and benefits of disclosure to reporting entities. Excessive political
accountability need not implement the regulation preferred by diversified investors.
Political pressures slow standard-setting and, if the standard-setter prefers high
levels of disclosure, induce regulatory cycles characterized by long phases of
increasing disclosure requirements followed by a sudden deregulation.
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Should standard-setters be accountable to the public and its elected representatives?
Historically, the question has been divisive. On the one hand, many standard-setters
argue against political interference; Dennis Beresford, a former chairman of the
Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB), notes that members of Congress
often strongly oppose certain FASB positions during congressional hearings:
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‘‘The FASB often is on the defensive because these hearings are generally convened
when certain companies, industry associations, or others allege that pending FASB
positions will cause serious economic harm if adopted as final accounting
standards’’ (Beresford 2001).1 On the other hand, government regulators have
often argued that standard-setting should be subject to high levels of political
oversight (Zeff 2003). Consistent with this view, the current institutional
environment provides the means for law-makers to immediately override any
accounting standard. This environment is different from other policy choices such as
judiciary rulings (e.g., the Supreme Court) or monetary policy (e.g., the Federal
Reserve).
Resolving this debate is difficult because, for the most part, the economic
consequences of political accountability are understudied. This paper proposes to
speak to this debate by examining the costs and benefits of political oversight on the
regulation of accounting standards. We examine this question within the general
paradigm of accountability in government and refer to accountability as a political
process that restrains the actions of a regulator (Laffont and Tirole 1991; Maskin
and Tirole 2004). As in this literature, we ask whether political accountability will
effectively discipline a regulator to implement a social objective.
To analyze the consequences of accountability, our theoretical model incorpo-
rates the following principal elements.
Reporting motives. Managers have private information about future cash flows
and prefer standards that maximize the (short-term) stock price after disclosures
have been made. Managers can report information voluntarily but cannot withhold
information in a manner that violates the disclosure regulation. Managers’
preference over regulations thus depends on their private information: managers
tend to prefer regulations in which (a) they have discretion to withhold their own
information (since they can always disclose voluntarily) but (b) other firms
observing comparably less favorable information must report their information.
Political accountability. Managers can collectively prevent a new standard from
being implemented by standard-setters, and, when this occurs, managers can impose
a preferred alternative. Standard-setters are more accountable when fewer managers
can block a new standard. However, as we show in the model, the standard preferred
by most managers is typically not the standard that maximizes welfare. We also
assume that standard-setters are not perfectly benevolent (welfare-maximizing) and
thus political accountability has a purpose. For example, the concepts statements of
the FASB emphasize promoting transparency but provide little room for deliber-
ation economic consequences or welfare. Hence, by design, the current institution
may prefer more transparency than is socially desirable.2
1 David Tweedie, a former chairman of the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB), casts
similar views about the political involvement during the 2008 financial crisis: ‘‘Last October, we suddenly
discovered the European Union was going to put through amendments to the law to allow European
companies to reclassify out of fair-value categories down to cost categories. We discovered with five
days. It was going through parliament. They had the votes.’’ (Tweedie 2009).
2 In Concepts Statements No. 8, the FASB notes that ‘‘to provide financial information about the
reporting entity that is useful to existing and potential investors, lenders, and other creditors in making
decisions about providing resources to the entity’’ (OB2, p. 1). This mandate has led the FASB to
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Evolution of standards. Accounting regulations are evolved institutions that
dynamically change over time.3 Reporting managers consider their preferred
alternative relative to the status quo if the current regulation remains in place. As a
result, the status quo determines whether managers will attempt to block a new
regulation and which new standards are politically feasible. With each new round of
standard-setting, the status quo evolves, leading to implications about the dynamics
of regulations. In the model, these dynamics can converge to a long-term stable
standard in which the issues are permanently settled or feature regulatory cycles
whose general patterns are analyzed.
We present below an overview of the model. The economy proceeds through
time and features successive generations of managers who, as is usual in this
literature, receive private information prior to the realization of final cash flows,
which they may disclose prior to a sale.
There are two channels through which managers disclose information. First, a
regulation requires a disclosure of certain events. Second, for events that are not
covered by the standard, managers may disclose voluntarily. Then, managers make
a productive decision and choose whether to (a) liquidate early and distribute the
proceeds to current shareholders or (b) continue and sell the firm at the expected
cash flow conditional on all disclosures, if any.
The disclosure regulation is selected as the outcome of a political game between
managers and the standard-setter. In each period, there is a status quo representing
the standard in the previous period. The standard-setter makes a new regulation
proposal, and managers can strategically decide whether to oppose the proposal.
The proposal fails whenever there is too much opposition. Then, the standard-setter
loses control over the agenda, and the new regulation is chosen by a regulator
maximizing approval over the status quo. The implemented regulation endoge-
nously evolves over time because the political opposition to a new standard is a
function of the status quo.
The primary result that emerges from the analysis is that political accountability
does not necessarily work to direct the standard-setter toward stable welfare-
maximizing regulations. Instead, excessive accountability can destabilize the
standard-setting process into recurring regulatory cycles. This situation occurs
specifically when a standard-setter desiring high levels of disclosure is subject to
Footnote 2 continued
generally advocate, by default, reporting all material information to the market since it is useful in making
decisions. Cost considerations are given a less prominent place, for example, are noted in the Appendix 1,
‘‘Some respondents expressed the view that the specified primary user group was too broad and that it
would result in too much information … However, too much is a subjective judgment. In developing
financial reporting requirements that meet the objective of financial reporting, the Boards will rely on the
qualitative characteristics of, and the cost constraint on, useful financial information to provide discipline
to avoid providing too much information’’ (discussions BC1.17, p. 9). These facts support our opinion
that, at least currently, the FASB has pushed for as much transparency as politically feasible but does not
refer to surplus (or price) maximization as the objective.
3 Our model focuses on the period in which an institution can mandate disclosures, for example, in the
United States, the post-SEC era. Our focus on evolution as a central characteristic borrows heavily from
Basu and Waymire (2008) and we refer to their study for a much broader analysis of the evolution of
accounting prior to the existence of centralized regulatory institutions.
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high levels of accountability. Regulatory cycles proceed along two phases. In the
first phase, increasingly comprehensive disclosure rules are imposed over time,
starting from an unregulated economy and evolving toward increased disclosure
requirements. Evolution is slow, especially when political accountability constrains
the standard-setter to increase disclosure requirements in small steps to offset
political opposition. In the second phase, the current regulation reaches a turning
point where most firms are required to disclose and force the standard-setter to cut
back on disclosure. What follows is a quick deregulation. Then, the new standard
moves to relatively low levels of disclosure and the next regulatory cycle begins.
The economic intuition for regulatory cycles is as follows. In this model,
disclosure requirements are optimally over unfavorable events (e.g., an asset
impairment) because these events are not reported voluntarily for individual
reporting purposes and result in reduced aggregate economic efficiency.4 In the first
phase of evolution, the standard-setter increases transparency by requiring that
relatively unfavorable events be subject to a disclosure requirement. Managers
newly subject to mandatory disclosure relative to the prior status quo oppose the
loss of discretion, and therefore a politically accountable standard-setter cannot
increase disclosure requirements too quickly without losing control of the proposal
process.
Over time, the status quo evolves with increasingly favorable events becoming
subject to the disclosure requirement. Eventually most of the firms are subject to
disclosure requirements, and the second phase of evolution begins. At this turning
point, the status quo is no longer the alternative collectively preferred by managers
because a disclosing firm is always weakly better off when retaining the discretion
to withhold information. Nor is a small decrease in disclosure requirements possible
because such a new regulation would be opposed by all remaining nondisclosers
under the status quo, because their market price would decrease. Hence, the solution
at this stage is an abrupt reduction in disclosure requirements, supported by the
largest fraction of firms that disclosed under the status quo but do not under the new
regulation.
A standard-setter who prefers low levels of transparency might not reach the
second phase, in which case the regulatory process will attain a long-term stable
regulation. Within our model assumptions, the second phase is not attained if the
standard-setter maximizes the average market price. Under this scenario, the
standard will converge to the price-maximizing disclosure requirement in the long
run but convergence is slower when the standard-setter is more accountable. We
further show that political accountability is entirely ineffective at disciplining a
standard-setter preferring lower disclosure requirements than the regulation
maximizing the market price.
The benefits of some independence from political pressures by policy-making
bodies such as the Federal Reserve or the Supreme Court has been the subject of a
4 This is a characteristic of most models involving costly voluntary disclosures. A voluntary disclosure
over favorable events carries a negative externality because, in equilibrium, it increases the price of the
disclosing firm at the expense of nondisclosers. Therefore, such models tend to feature excessive
disclosures over favorable events than socially optimal (Verrecchia 1983; Shavell 1994, for examples).
As such, a regulation should not worsen this inefficiency by increasing favorable disclosures even further.
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large literature in institutional economics (Kydland and Prescott 1977; Gely and
Spiller 1990). However, this literature does not examine debates that pertain
specifically to accounting regulations. Several recent empirical studies provide
evidence that firms pressure regulators strategically, in response to the perceived
market consequences of regulation proposals (Chan et al. 2006; Hochberg et al.
2009; Allen and Ramanna 2013). While these studies have made researchers aware
of the key role of political pressures, they are descriptive and do not test predictions
about the effects of political activism on disclosure standards.
Relating to these issues, a strand of the literature analyzes the influence of various
parties in the standard-setting process (Amershi et al. 1982; Fields and King 1996);
our research focus here is different in that we take influence as the starting point and
study how it may affect regulatory choice.5 Our study also complements a recent
literature on institutional design in accounting, which discusses how certain
characteristics of the institution affect policy choices. The broad implications of the
consolidating standard-setting into a single body are discussed by Dye and Sunder
(2001), Basu and Waymire (2008) and Bertomeu and Cheynel (2013). These studies
find various benefits in multipolar standard-setting institutions in which market
forces will push for more efficient standards. At the other side of this debate, Ray
(2012) examines the potential learning cost of having multiple standards, and
Friedman and Heinle (2014) show that multiple standards magnify the social costs
of corporate lobbying.
Section 1 of the paper presents the basic model and some preliminary results.
Section 2 provides an analysis of managers’ preferences and the disclosure rule that
will be instituted if the standard-setter loses control of the agenda. The standard-
setter’s strategy for keeping control of the agenda appears in Sect. 3, and the
evolution of disclosure rules over time is discussed in Sect. 4. Section 5 discusses
the effects of relaxing the model’s assumptions, and Sect. 6 concludes. The
appendices provide a table of notation (Table 1), proofs, and further analysis of the
design of disclosure regulations.
1 Model and preliminaries
The economy unfolds over an infinite time horizon, with periods indexed by t 0,
and is populated by successive generations of standard-setters and atomistic firms
that deliver their cash flow at the end of the period. Each firm has been initially
financed with equity, and some of this equity is owned by the manager (possibly as
part of a compensation arrangement), while the remaining portion is held by
diversified investors. The timeline of each period contains the following events, as
illustrated in Fig. 1.
At date t:1, managers receive private information about an end-of-period cash
flow. For now, we assume that all managers are informed and further considerations
5 There are many prior studies that have analyzed mandatory disclosure (Melumad et al. 1999; Pae 2000;
Marra and Suijs 2004) or whether particular forms of selective disclosure have desirable effects on
economic efficiency (Liang and Wen 2007; Chen et al. 2009); however, the core focus of these studies is
normative in nature in that they focus on the economic desirability of disclosure rules.
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in the case of some uninformed managers are delayed until the main results are
presented. Each firm has an i.i.d. cash flow v that is distributed according to a
uniform distribution with support on ½0; 1.
At date t:2, a new regulatory process begins. We focus here on regulations
described by a threshold A such that events with v\A must be disclosed. This
restriction is with some loss of generality as it takes as a given the use of
impairment-based rules (widespread in accounting), such as lower-of-cost-or-
market, impairments of long-lived assets or other-than-temporary losses, advance
recognitions of loss-making sales, etc.6 We show in Appendix 2 that this form of
mandatory disclosure maximizes popularity because, in our model, favorable events
are already disclosed voluntarily.
Denote At1 as the status quo, defined as the regulation implemented in the
previous period and beginning with no disclosure A0 ¼ 0. The regulatory process
takes place over two stages, on which we elaborate in Fig. 2.
At stage t:2ðaÞ, the standard-setter makes a proposal A (e.g., an exposure draft).
We endow the standard-setter with a single-peaked preference UðAÞ with a
maximum at A 2 ð0; 1Þ.7 Managers are empowered to vote for their firm and may
oppose the proposal. We capture their influence by a function OppðA;At1Þ, defined
as the fraction of managers who are strictly worse off under A than they would be if
the proposal were to fail. This construct intends to capture several venues through
which, in practice, corporate lobbies can oppose a new regulation, such as comment
letters or congressional hearings. Note that this function will be solved for by
backward induction, as we assume that managers have rational expectations about
what standard will pass at t:2ðbÞ if the standard-setter’s proposal fails.
Note that we do not model supporters for a new standard at this stage because, in
practice, comment letters and congressional hearings overwhelmingly focus on
groups that have grievances against a new proposed regulation (Beresford 2001;



























Fig. 1 Model timeline
6 It is an open question as to whether one might call this type rule conservative. Our primary
interpretation of such a rule is primarily in terms of accounting for a particular transaction, say ‘‘impair an
asset if its value falls below a certain level but do not report any information otherwise.’’ Similar types of
disclosure rules can be found, among others, in Goex and Wagenhofer (2009), Caskey and Hughes
(2012), Beyer (2012), Fischer and Qu (2013), and Bertomeu and Cheynel (2013).
7 This formulation places minimal restrictions on a preference meant to capture the (many) complex
motives of standard-setters, such as, for example, a general preference for transparency, the demands of
auditors and the accounting profession or a desire to provide stewardship information for various pre-
disclosure decisions.
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The parameter a 2 ½0; 1 captures the political accountability of the standard-setter:
from a ¼ 1 such that any proposal passes to a ¼ 0 such that unanimity is required.
Managers’ votes are not observable to investors.
If OppðA;At1Þ[ a, the proposal is rejected and stage t:2ðbÞ begins in which the
standard-setter no longer controls the agenda. Then, a new proposal is made by an
office-driven bureaucrat or politician (such as a congressional subcommittee), who
has a greater chance of staying in office or being elected when the proposal is more
popular.8 Formally, we define the popularity of a regulation A 6¼ At1 as
NetðA;At1Þ, indicating the difference between the fraction of firms strictly
better-off and the fraction of firms strictly worse off under A versus the status quo
At1. NetðA;At1Þ has a discontinuity at A ¼ At1, so we extend this function by
continuity and set NetðAt1;At1Þ ¼ lim supA!At1 NetðA;At1Þ. Put differently, this
means that A ¼ At1 also refers to an infinitesimally small change to the status quo;
in the limit, we interpret this situation as one in which the status quo is maintained.9
We assume that the most popular regulation At 2 argmaxANetðA;At1Þ is
implemented. For later use, we define the PopðAt1Þ as the most popular
regulation, where PopðAt1Þ 2 argmaxA NetðA;At1Þ. This function affects man-
agers’ opposition to the standard-setter’s proposals, and therefore the standard-
setter’s choice of proposed disclosure rules. Except for the knife-edge case of
At ¼ maxð1=2; 4c=ð4cþ 1ÞÞ, the most popular regulation is unique; however,
should this knife-edge occur, we can select the solution closest to the status quo.
At date t:3, managers learn a liquidation cash flow h, drawn from an i.i.d. uniform
distribution with support on ½0; 1. If the firm is liquidated, the end-of-period
expected cash flow v is forfeited, and h is distributed with no further need for
disclosure. If the firm continues, the payoff h is forfeited. This step is not critical for










If Opp(A,At−1) ≤ α, At = A is implemented.
Otherwise, the standard-setter no
longer controls the agenda.
t.2(b)
Firms set the most popular
At ∈ argmax Net(A,At−1),
where Net(A,At−1) is the total
net support for A over At−1 .
t.3
Fig. 2 Regulatory process
8 When faced with too much political resistance, a congressional body might threaten to shift the drafting
of new standards to a more docile institution (or force the replacement of current standard-setters). For
example, in the United States, Congress threatened to remove the privileges of the FASB if it did not
rescind its standard on oil and gas accounting (during the late seventies) or its original exposure draft on
stock option expensing (during the mid-nineties).
9 This is in shorthand for a model in which the status quo must be moved by at least [ 0 to be placed on
the agenda. As  ! 0, it would take an arbitrarily large number of periods to move away from the status
quo.
Political pressures and the evolution of disclosure regulation 781
123
productive purpose. The assumption serves to illustrate the economic distortions
created by the political process in an environment where the price-maximizing
regulation might feature some nonzero level of regulated disclosure.
At date t:4, managers make their disclosures, which we denote dtðvÞ 2 fv;NDg.
If v\At, a disclosure is mandatory and dtðvÞ ¼ v. If vAt, the firm can withhold
information and choose dtðvÞ ¼ ND or disclose dtðvÞ ¼ v voluntarily. There is a
cost c[ 0 when making a mandatory or a voluntary disclosure. Hence, we assume
that the same underlying technology is used in both disclosure channels; for
example, the cost may represent a formal audit or leakages of proprietary
information. Nondisclosers must also certify that v[At, which we assume entails a
cost Atc that is linear in the probability of the event ‘‘vAt.’’ As more values of v
are required to be disclosed, the greater the cost to certify that non-disclosure is
appropriate. To avoid straightforward environments in which the standard-setter can
pass any policy, we assume that a is not too large relative to the cost, that is,
a a ¼ minðc; 2c=ð4cþ 1ÞÞ.
At date t:4, managers sell their shares in a competitive market. Conditional on a
public disclosure x 2 ½0; 1 [ fNDg, investors price the firm at the expected cash
flow minus the disclosure cost if any:
PtðxÞ ¼ EðvjdtðvÞ ¼ xÞ  1dtðvÞ6¼NDc 1dtðvÞ¼NDAtc; ð1:1Þ
where 1dtðvÞ6¼ND (resp., 1dtðvÞ¼ND) is an indicator function equal to 1 if a disclosure is
made (resp., if no disclosure is made) and zero otherwise.
In what follows, let st represent the threshold above which the event v would be
disclosed voluntarily if it were not subject to mandatory disclosure. As is well
known (Jovanovic 1982; Verrecchia 1983), this voluntary disclosure threshold
threshold is determined by the point at which a firm is indifferent between a
voluntary disclosure and a non-disclosure,10




Solving this equation, the voluntary disclosure threshold is given by
st ¼ At þ 2cð1  AtÞ: ð1:3Þ
As is entirely intuitive, increasing the mandatory disclosure threshold At increases
market expectations and thus also increases the voluntary disclosure threshold. We
also note that the fraction of disclosing firms 1  ðst  AtÞ increases when the
mandatory disclosure threshold At is increased.
Substituting (1.3) into (1.2) to derive
10 This threshold is not affected by the liquidation option. Firms with liquidation value h liquidate if that
value exceeds their continuation value. For a firm that discloses, the continuation value is v c,
regardless of the liquidation value that was not taken. Firms in the non-disclosure region all receive the
same continuation value. Those with h above this value liquidate, and those with h below the continuation
value sell their firms at the non-disclosure price. But v and h are assumed independent, so the value of
continuing, non-disclosure firms is unaffected by liquidation.
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PtðNDÞ ¼ ð1  2cÞAt þ c: ð1:4Þ
This implies that a firm, as long as it remains a nondiscloser, obtains a higher market
price when the mandatory disclosure threshold At is increased. The next lemma
summarizes these observations, which are used throughout our analysis.11
Lemma 1.1 The probability of disclosure and the non-disclosure market price are
increasing in the disclosure threshold At.
2 Popularity over the status quo
We solve the model by backward induction in period t and first analyze stage t.2(b)
of the regulatory process, that is, after the proposal made by the standard-setter fails.
At this point, managers select the most popular regulation A against the status quo
At1, with voluntary disclosure thresholds sA and st1, respectively. We consider
next several scenarios for the choice of A.
The first scenario involves a new regulation A such that the non-disclosure price
increases relative to the status quo At1. For this to hold, the regulation A must
feature more mandatory disclosure than the status quo, implying A[At1. Below,
we analyze the preference of a manager with continuation value v.
(a) Disclosers under both regulations, with v 62 ½At1; sAÞ or v 2 ½st1;AÞ, are
indifferent;
(b) disclosers under A but not At1, with v 2 ½At1; minðA; st1ÞÞ, prefer the status
quo because, they retain and exercise the option to withhold information;
(c) nondisclosers under A, with v 2 ½A; sA prefer A; because they achieve a
higher non-disclosure price.
These three regions are represented in Fig. 3. The net popularity of A over At1 is
thus given by the fraction of shaded firms in region (c) minus the fraction of striped
firms in region (b). As A moves away from At1, the number of firms in favor of the
change (region a) decreases, and the number of firms that prefer the status quo
(region b) increases. Therefore, the maximal net popularity is achieved by a
regulation with A set arbitrarily close to At1, which achieves the objective of
increasing the non-disclosure price with a minimal fraction of new disclosers (that
oppose). As noted earlier, we interpret this situation in the limit as one in which the
status quo does not materially change. Note also that, at the point of standard-
setting, firms do not yet know their liquidation payoff h: they may either liquidate or
continue, whichever yields the highest payoff. Given that liquidation implies a fixed
payoff that does not depend on the standard, they always prefer standards that yield
a higher continuation price.
11 In a recent study, Einhorn (2005) considers the interaction between mandatory and voluntary
disclosure, when each disclosure is about different (correlated) information. By contrast, in this model,
mandatory and voluntary disclosures are about the same piece of information.
Political pressures and the evolution of disclosure regulation 783
123
Things are different with a decrease in mandatory disclosure. When a new policy
reduces the disclosure threshold strictly below the status quo, it is opposed by all
nondisclosers. However, the policy also tends to be supported by all firms that had
to disclose under the status quo but no longer have to disclose (see Fig. 4).
As A\At1 is decreased, this new policy turns more disclosers into nondisclosers
(shaded area in Fig. 4) and receives more support, while the opposing firms (striped
area in Fig. 4) are constant. Indeed, the most preferred decrease in mandatory
disclosure is one that features the greatest probability of non-disclosure for
previously disclosing firms, which in our case corresponds to a complete removal of
any mandatory disclosure A ¼ 0.
In summary, the most popular reporting alternative will be one of two options—
either maintain the status quo or do away with the mandatory disclosure altogether
and return to an unregulated environment. Nondisclosers vote as a block and play a
key role in this result. Specifically, complete deregulation maximizes the fraction of
new nondisclosers (relative to the status quo), while a small increase in the
regulation A  At1, maximizes the fraction of nondisclosers with the constraint of
increasing the non-disclosure price. In the next proposition, we compare the relative
popularity of each of these alternatives.
Proposition 2.1 Let A^ ¼ maxð1=2; 4c=ð4cþ 1ÞÞ.
(i) If At1  A^ (low levels of disclosure), the most popular standard is the
status quo PopðAt1Þ ¼ At1.
(ii) If At1 [ A^ (high levels of disclosure), the most popular standard is no
disclosure PopðAt1Þ ¼ 0.
A 0 A 













If A > τ ,t-1
If A < τ ,t-1
firm’s continuation value v
firm’s continuation value v
region (c): prefer A 
over status-quo A
region ( b): prefer  
status-quo A    over A
region ( a): 
indifferent t-1 t-1
small increase in mandatory 
disclosure threshold






Fig. 3 Preference for an alternative threshold disclosure A versus a status quo disclosure threshold
At1\A
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Proposition 2.1 describes the main economic drivers of our study. status quo
nondisclosers tend to support increases in the disclosure threshold, while status quo
disclosers tend to support reducing disclosure requirements. As a result, nondis-
closers form a majority when the status quo features low levels of disclosure.
However, if the status quo features sufficiently high levels of disclosure, disclosers
become more numerous than nondisclosers, and the alternative preferred by
managers shifts from maintaining the status quo to no disclosure.
Corollary 2.1 The threshold A^ on the status quo, above which no disclosure
becomes the most popular option, is nondecreasing in c.
The comparative statics in the cost c may seem counterintuitive to the extent that,
intuitively, one could expect less disclosure to become more appealing in the
presence of greater cost. On the contrary, a greater disclosure cost shifts the
threshold A^ to the right, and therefore no disclosure A ¼ 0 is collectively preferred
over a smaller set of status quo standards when c increases.
To understand this property, recall that the political process does not directly
weight the expected market price as an objective so that the relevant argument is not
that it is socially desirable to reduce disclosure in the presence of higher cost.
Instead, the key argument is that status quo nondisclosers—which benefit from
higher market prices—are the group that typically supports more disclosure. Hence,
an increase in the size of the non-disclosure group tends to increase the demand for
more mandatory disclosure. Within this logic, a greater disclosure cost will reduce
the amount of voluntary disclosure implying, for any status quo, an increase in the
size of the non-disclosure group.
A 0 A 1
τ τA 
If A   < τ ,A
If A  < τ ,
firm’s continuation value v
region (c): prefer A 
over status-quo A
region ( b): prefer  
status-quo A    over A
region ( a): 
indifferent





τfirm’s continuation value v
large decrease in mandatory 
disclosure threshold
disclosure threshold










Fig. 4 Preference for an alternative threshold disclosure A versus a status quo disclosure threshold
At1 [A
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3 The standard-setter’s proposal
We analyze next the standard-setter’s proposal stage at t:2ðaÞ. This stage is
composed of two decision nodes. First, at t:2ða:iÞ, the standard-setter issues a new
regulation A. Since, in this model, the standard-setter would never propose a
regulation that is certain to fail, the proposal can be restricted to satisfy
OppðA;At1Þ a. Second, at t:2ða:iiÞ, managers decide whether to oppose A,
expecting that, if A fails, the most popular standard PopðAt1Þ will be implemented
(as described in Proposition 2.1). We will show that a status quo could never reach
above the level preferred by the standard-setter A, so we save space by focusing
here on the case of At1 2 ½0;A.
Again, we proceed by backward induction to derive the opposition at t:2ða:iiÞ.
Because At1 2 ½0;A, the standard-setter wishes to increase the disclosure
threshold. There are two cases to consider, illustrated in Fig. 5. If At1  A^, the
status quo will be maintained if the proposal fails. Therefore, all nondisclosers under
At1 oppose any A that would remove their discretion to withhold: opposition
increases if the standard-setters’ proposal requires more events to be disclosed. If,
on the other hand, At1 [ A^, the economy will be unregulated if the standard-
setter’s proposal fails. Therefore, all managers who would not disclose in the
unregulated environment tend to oppose a proposal in which they must disclose.
The next proposition formalizes the political tension faced faced by the standard-
setter. The more the standard-setter wishes to increase mandatory disclosure, the
more managers begin opposing the proposal. Put differently, the analysis
demonstrates that high levels of political accountability slow down standard-setting.
Proposition 3.1 For a given status quo At1 A, the standard-setter implements
a new regulation At ¼ minðA;PopðAt1Þ þ aÞ. This disclosure threshold is
increasing in the disclosure cost c, decreasing in the political accountability 1  a
and, as long as At\A^, increasing in the status quo At1. Furthermore, At\At1
(i.e., the disclosure threshold is reduced) if and only if At1 [ A^.
As long as the status quo is not too large (below A^), managers refer to the status
quo as the most preferred regulation. The standard-setter can spend up to a in
political capital to increase the policy above the status quo. However, when the
turning point A^ is passed, the manager-preferred regulation reverts to the
unregulated economy ðA ¼ 0Þ, and therefore the standard-setter can only increase
the disclosure threshold relative to this new benchmark. As a result, the standard-
setter must concede a reduction in mandatory disclosure to A ¼ a under the threat
that, doing otherwise, the proposal would be rejected, and lead to an entirely
unregulated economy.12 While, in the model, the economy never reaches a state of
12 It is noteworthy that, in our framework, the second ‘‘management-controlled’’ regulatory stage never
occurs in equilibrium, because the standard-setter should always make a proposal that passes. In practice,
cases in which an exposure draft fails are unusual, and even more rare are cases in which the standard-
setter actually issued a standard and then was forced to remove it. This being said, the basic model can be
easily extended to a setting in which the standard-setter does not fully know a by the time a proposal is
made, in which case there would be occurrences in which an exposure draft fails.
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complete deregulation, the regulation At ¼ a may feature very low levels of
mandatory disclosure in cases where political accountability is very high.
Some simple comparative statics follow. If the standard-setter pushes for more
disclosure or has more political independence, a greater level of mandatory
disclosure will be required in the exposure draft. In the extreme case in which a  0
is very low, the standard-setter increases mandatory disclosure by a very small
increment and cannot implement any major piece of legislation (unless A[ A^, and
the new legislation moves toward deregulation). When the cost of disclosure
increases, more nondisclosers support the status quo, thus helping the standard-
setter increase mandatory disclosure.
We conclude this section by examining a scenario in which, for an exogenous
(unmodelled) reason, the status quo is greater than the standard-setter’s preferred
threshold A. As an example, At1 may be greater than A if the default standard for
a new transaction has branched out from some other standard, or there may be a
structural break in the cost of disclosures (e.g., change in legal systems, more
information technology), or a change in the preferences of the standard-setter or the
constituencies it represents. Since this case is identical to the previous setting if
PopðAt1Þ ¼ 0, we focus here on PopðAt1Þ ¼ At1 (or A\A^).
While the standard-setter will now want to decrease the disclosure threshold,
doing so can be problematic. As shown earlier, decreases in the threshold are
opposed by all nondisclosers, and therefore any A\At1 generates an opposition
given by:
OppðA;At1Þ ¼ st1  At1: ð3:1Þ
When At1 is not too large, this term can be greater than a, and therefore a standard-
setter subject to high levels of accountability cannot pass any decrease in the dis-
closure threshold, even if she wishes to do so. This observation stands in contrast
A 0 A 




Low status-quo: A   <  A
firm’s continuation value v
firm’s continuation value v
managers losing option to withhold and
opposing standard-setter’s proposal A.








increase in mandatory 
disclosure threshold
Fig. 5 Opposition to standard-setter’s proposal A
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with increases in the disclosure threshold, in which some small increase relative to
PopðAt1Þ may generally be passed.
Proposition 3.2 Suppose that At1 2 ðA; A^Þ (the status quo implies more
disclosure than preferred by the standard-setter).
(i) If a st1  At1, the standard-setter implements At ¼ A.
(ii) Otherwise, the standard-setter maintains the status quo at At ¼ At1.
In summary, high political accountability joint with a status quo featuring high
disclosure levels creates a political standstill. Because of the pressure by status quo
nondisclosers, the standard-setter cannot reduce the amount of disclosure. Then, the
equilibrium level of disclosure may remain at levels that the standard-setter views as
excessive but is politically unable to change.
4 Evolution of mandatory disclosure
We now use the predictions obtained in each period t to examine the dynamics of
disclosure regulations. The sequence of regulatory outcomes is denoted fAtg with
initial condition A0 ¼ 0 and the updating rule described in Proposition 3.1.
Several scenarios may occur. One scenario is that the standard-setter does not
wish to implement too much disclosure A  A^. Then, the deregulation region
‘‘At1  A^’’ is never reached, and the standard-setter can always attain the preferred
policy. If political accountability is high, reaching A is a slow process that requires
many periods of regulation.
A second scenario is that A[ A^ if, for example, the standard-setter has a
preference for high levels of transparency. Then, the standard-setter will increase
the threshold gradually, until At1 [ A^ is reached. Then, the economy reverts to
being (nearly) unregulated and a new cycle begins.
Proposition 4.1 The regulatory process fAtg has the following properties:
(i) If the standard-setter prefers low levels of disclosure (i.e., A  A^), At ¼
minðat;AÞ is increasing in t and converges to A.
(ii) If the standard-setter prefers high levels of disclosure (i.e., A[ A^), At is
nonmonotonic and features cycles of length k ¼ ½A^=a þ 1, decreasing in a,
whereby for any n 0 and t 2 ½1; k, Ankþt ¼ At ¼ minðat;AÞ.
Figure 6 illustrates a regulatory process for each scenario. The standard-setter
pushes toward A, increasing the threshold by a in each period. If this is sufficient to
attain the standard-setter’s preferred regulation A, as on the left side of the figure,
the regulatory process settles for the long run. On the right-hand side, an example is
given in which A[ A^. When the process reaches above A^, the regulation will
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revert back to A1. For instance, a period t  1 standard-setter may have been able to
set the standard at At1 [ A^. But then the period t standard-setter inherits a standard
that cannot be sustained. The most popular disclosure rule among firms is no
disclosure at all, and the period t standard-setter must limit the reduction in
disclosure by proposing A1.
Another point worth emphasizing is that cycles can be very long if a is low. In
particular, deregulation will be more intense when it follows after a longer period of
increased regulation and when the standard-setter increased the regulation only
slowly (since the deregulation that occurs at the end of each cycle is to A1 ¼ a).
A closer inspection of the threshold A^ will reveal an important fact about cycles
in our model. Although conceptual statements do not explicitly mention price-
maximization as an objective of standard-setting, a useful welfare benchmark arises
if the standard-setter simply acts in the best interest of diversified investors A ¼ Afb
where Afb maximizes the expected value of a firm. Formally, Afb is the mandatory
disclosure threshold that maximizes the expected value (over v and h) of the
maximum of the liquidation value h and the continuation value, which is either
equal to PtðNDÞ or PtðvÞ ¼ v c depending on the disclosure,
Afb ¼ argmaxAt Eðmaxðh; 1v2½At ;st PtðNDÞ þ 1v 62½At ;st PtðvÞÞ: ð4:1Þ
Corollary 4.1 The first-best disclosure threshold Afb is always lower than A^.
Hence, a standard-setter that maximizes value to investors, with A ¼ Afb, will not
induce regulatory cycles.
Our results thus suggest that a standard-setting body that is primarily controlled
by diversified investors provides an additional side benefit to the regulatory process.
This standard-setter will not issue standards that will be later rescinded during
regulatory cycles.































New standard A t
Fig. 6 The regulatory process: convergence versus cycles
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Observe that Proposition 4.1 is derived under the (debatable) assumption of a
myopic standard-setter. However, myopic standard-setting is suboptimal for a
patient standard-setter if excessive increases in the regulation trigger cycles.
Fortunately, the argument can be easily extended to a scenario in which the
standard-setter has a multi-period objective function. Assume that the standard-






where b 2 ½0; 1Þ is the standard-setter’s discount rate with b ¼ 0 corresponding to
the myopic standard-setter discussed in the baseline model.
The case in which A  A^ is straightforward. As shown in Proposition 4.1 [case
(i)], this is a situation in which the sequence of policies fAtg chosen by the myopic
standard-setter converges to A. Since the myopic standard-setter already increases
At as much as political pressures allow it each period, these policy choices remain
optimal for any discount factor b.
If A[ A^, a different course of action might be optimal as a forward-looking
standard-setter may strategically avoid cycles. To begin with, note that the forward-
looking standard-setter will still propose Atþ1 ¼ At þ a as long as At þ a\A^ and the
status quo that would start a cycle is not yet reached. Things are different when the
critical status quo At is reached such that At  A^ but At þ a[ A^. At this point, the
forward-looking standard-setter must make a choice over two possible options: (a)
implement Atþ1 ¼ minðA;At þ aÞ and trigger a cycle in the next period, or (b)
implement Atþ1 ¼ A^ and stabilize the regulation at A^\A for all future periods.
Proposition 4.2 Let K be defined as:
K ¼ UðminðA; akÞÞ  UðA^Þ þ
Xk1
n¼1
bnðUðanÞ  UðA^ÞÞ: ð4:2Þ
(i) If A  A^ or K[ 0, the standard-setting dynamics will be identical to the
baseline in Proposition 4.1.
(ii) Otherwise, the standard-setter will implement Atþ1 ¼ minðAt þ a; A^Þ, and
the policy will always stabilize at A^ in the long run.
A forward-looking standard-setter will evaluate the current benefit of passing a
high policy At[ A^ against the future losses caused by the regulatory cycle. This
may imply that an intermediate policy set at A^ becomes attractive. In this case, the
standard-setter does not achieve her preferred policy A even in the long run.
Note that, while an impatient standard-setter never stabilizes, a fully patient
standard-setter (when b converges to one) may also opt not to stabilize. For
example, if UðminðAs; akÞ; cÞ  UðA^; cÞ is large, K[ 0 will be positive for any
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discount factor. On the other hand, stabilization is optimal if the cost of triggering a
new cycle is large enough. This only occurs when a is small, so that, once a new
cycle begins, it takes a large number of periods to increase the policy toward A^.
Hence, a forward-looking standard-setter with high levels of political accountability
generally tends to favor stabilization.
5 Discussion
In the preceding sections, we analyzed the model under several assumptions that
allow us to lay out the core intuitions in their simplest form. We develop here some
further discussion points that are relevant in richer economic environments.
Uninformed participants. In the baseline model, firms that can participate in the
political process must be endowed with information, so that uninformed managers
(or diversified investors) may only be represented via the standard-setter’s actions
and preferences. The model has similar dynamics if we assume that there is a
proportion of firms active in the political process that are uninformed. In this case,
uninformed managers vote as a group in favor of standards closer to Afb. In turn, this
tends to cause an interval of standards located around Afb where the policy can
settle. Then, the standard-setter can no longer increase the threshold because doing
so would be opposed by all uninformed managers. Hence, when the probability of
not being informed is large enough, the policy may not settle at A or cycle but
instead will settle at some level between Afb and A.
Distributional assumptions. The main result on cycles is robust to a more general
specification of the cash flow distribution. Specifically, even if distributions are not
uniformly distributed, the opposition to a standard will increase as the standard-
setter elevates the proposal too far above the status quo (i.e., nondisclosers oppose
new requirements in which they have to disclose) and a decrease in the disclosure
threshold must be large enough so that enough firms that no longer disclose under
the new standard support it. Nevertheless, a few observations in the model are
specific to the uniform. First, the fact that the standard would increase by fixed
increments is specific to the flat density of the uniform distribution; under other bell-
shaped distributions, for example, the threshold would increase by fixed ‘‘proba-
bility mass’’ increments, faster in the tails where the density is thin and few firms
oppose and slower near the mean where more firms oppose. Second, the disclosure
threshold falls toward no mandatory disclosure when a new cycle begins under the
uniform distribution; it will fall by a large amount as well with more general
distributions but only up to the level that would maximize the total fraction of
nondisclosers. In general, this level need not be complete deregulation because no
disclosure might entail a significant amount of voluntary disclosure. Third, in the
baseline model, the level that maximizes the market price is always below the
cycling threshold. This may or may not be true for more general distributions, and,
in particular for distributions that are skewed, the cycling region may even be
reached before the ex ante preferred is reached.
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Other real effects. We have focused on a simple liquidation decision as the real
effect but the results would be similar if we assumed a post-disclosure real effect
since the main argument follows from only two forces, both of which would still
hold with real effects, that: (1) firms forced to disclose are weakly worse off since
they could do so voluntarily, and (2) nondisclosers benefit with a standard that
features a higher threshold A. To the extent that a general model would change the
distribution of cash flows, many of the incremental forces with production would be
similar to those with general distributions, as discussed above.
Time-varying environment. As in any model featuring multi-period dynamics, we
have focused the baseline on the main variable of interest, the disclosure threshold
as a moving part. Similar predictions can be inferred from the analysis for various
shocks to fundamentals, and we discuss a few. If, for example, the quality of
projects were to vary, then there would be more demand to reduce the disclosure
threshold during periods with fewer high-quality projects (recessions) and, vice
versa, demand to increase the disclosure threshold during periods with fewer low-
quality projects (expansions), as in Bertomeu and Magee (2011). As another
possibility, the political independence of the standard-setter a might randomly
change across periods, possibly in tandem with changes in fundamentals. This
would cause the standard-setter to possibly attain the preferred level A during
periods of high independence only to trigger deregulation during a period of low
independence.
Proposal game. In the baseline model, we assume that, once a standard-setter’s
proposal fails, a new regulator makes the most popular proposal. The conceptual
results would be similar if, at this stage, we assume that a new proposal is selected
from the set of proposals that obtain a majority M ¼ fA : NetðA;At1Þ :5g
according to some decision rule (provided that, if this set includes a sufficiently
small subset of values A[At1, the decision rule must be below At1). For
example, another possibility would be to use a Baron and Ferejohn (1989) random
proposer game (i.e., a standard proposer is drawn randomly and can make a proposal
in M). This type of model would feature stochastic dynamics, as the identity of the
proposer would vary, with possibly random increases and a random date of a
fallback to a lower threshold. Such a one-step random proposer game, by partly
taking away agenda-setting power from the standard-setter, would also tend to make
regulatory cycles more likely (and less predictable).13
6 Concluding remarks
Financial reporting standard setters strive to achieve a balance between independent
assessment of the benefits of reporting changes and the variety of viewpoints
presented by interested parties. For instance, the FASB (2009, p. 2) describes the
following as one of its precepts:14
13 A version of this model is available from the authors, in which some conditions on the distribution are
given such that the model would feature regulatory cycles even when disclosure costs are zero.
14 Financial Accounting Standards Board. 2009. Facts about FASB. Norwalk, CT.
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To weigh carefully the views of its constituents in developing concepts and
standards: However, the ultimate determinant of concepts and standards must
be the Board’s judgment, based on research, public input, and careful
deliberation about the usefulness of the resulting information.
Notwithstanding standard-setters’’ objective of independence, there are times
when standard setting bodies are subject to political pressure and when that pressure
affects the standards that are adopted. Zeff (2005) chronicles the political forces that
have affected U.S. GAAP, from allowing LIFO inventory accounting to accounting
for the investment tax credit to the expensing of employee stock options. Beresford
(2001) describes the U.S. congressional activities surrounding the accounting for
acquisitions, and he recounts the pressures encountered by the FASB from
companies and from members of Congress. He concludes: ‘‘Congressional oversight
is an essential part of our society and our economic environment. Although we may
disagree with the motives of some of the parties who avail themselves of this
opportunity, few of us favor a system where a group like the FASB is accountable to
no one.’’
How might political pressures affect the evolution of accounting standards?
Distinctive to our approach is to place the standard-setting institution as a strategic
agent subject to objectives and constraints: regulation emerges endogenously as a
result of trade-offs between meeting those objectives and responding to opportu-
nistic political pressures. Reporting firms always have the option to disclose
voluntarily, so they oppose any requirements that decrease their discretion.
Increases in required disclosure proceed more slowly when the standard-setter is
less politically influential or when greater disclosure costs imply greater political
resistance by reporting firms. In addition, there is a critical point in the disclosure
regulation at which the reporting firms prefer to eliminate all regulation, perhaps
forcing a fallback to low disclosure requirements. Such regulatory cycles, when they
occur, would take the form of steady increases in disclosure, punctuated by bursts of
deregulation. We hope that examining the economic forces at play provides one first
step furthering the understanding of accounting regulation, and that future research
in this domain will extend this paradigm to other dimensions of accounting
regulation.
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Appendix 1: Omitted proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.1 Let At be the implemented regulation at date t. The
probability of disclosure pd is given by:
ptd ¼ Aþ 1  2cð1  AtÞ  At ¼ 2cAt þ 1  2c:




ðAt þ stÞ  cAt ¼ At þ cð1  AtÞ  cAt ¼ ð1  2cÞAt þ c:
This function is increasing At. h
Proof of Proposition 2.1 We know from the analysis in text that we need to
compare NetðAt1;At1Þ ¼ lim!0þ NetðAt1 þ ;At1Þ to Netð0;At1Þ. Note that
NetðAt1;At1Þ  Netð0;At1Þ is strictly decreasing in At1 so that there exists a
threshold A^ such that PopðAt1Þ ¼ 1At1  A^At1. We determine this threshold next as
NetðA^; A^Þ ¼ Netð0; A^Þ.
Case 1 Suppose that A^ 2c.
NetðA^; A^Þ ¼ Netð0; A^Þ;
ð1  A^Þ2c ¼ A^ ð1  A^Þ2c;
4c ¼ A^ð4cþ 1Þ;
4c
4cþ 1 ¼ A^:
Verifying that A^ ¼ 4c=ð4cþ 1Þ 2c requires that c 1=4.
Case 2 Suppose A^[ 2c.
NetðA^; A^Þ ¼ Netð0; A^Þ
ð1  A^Þ2c ¼ 2c ð1  A^Þ2c
1=2 ¼ A^:
ð7:1Þ
For 1=2[ 2c, one must have that c\1=4.
In summary, we have demonstrated that A^ ¼ maxð1=2; 4c=ð4cþ 1ÞÞ. h
Proof of Proposition 3.1 Recall that we focus here on At1 A so that the
standard-setter prefers the maximal feasible regulation, up to A. Define Amax as the
maximum regulation that would pass and let us solve for Amax.
Suppose that At1  A^. Then, the most popular regulation is PopðAt1Þ ¼ At1. It
follows that for any proposed policy A[At1,
OppðA;At1Þ ¼ minð2cð1  At1Þ;A At1Þ:
794 J. Bertomeu, R. P. Magee
123
Because a 2cð1  A^Þ, OppðAmax;At1Þ\2cð1  At1Þ. Therefore, Amax ¼
minð1;At1 þ aÞ.
Suppose that At1 [ A^. Then, the most popular regulation is PopðAt1Þ ¼ 0. It
follows that for any proposed policy A[ 0,
OppðA;At1Þ ¼ minð2c;AÞ
Therefore, Amax is given by Amax ¼ a.
It then follows that the standard-setter’s optimal proposal (which passes) is:
At ¼ minðPopðAt1Þ þ a;AÞ ¼ 1At1  A^minðA;At1 þ aÞ þ 1At1 [ A^minðA; aÞ:
Note that At is increasing in PopðAt1Þ, a and A. h
Proof of Proposition 3.2 There are two cases to consider, depending on whether
At1  A^ (case 1) or At1 [ A^ (case 2).
Case 1 If At1  A^, the policy that passes if the standard-setter’s proposal fails is
the status quo At1. It follows that all nondisclosing managers oppose any decrease
in A, and therefore (any) A\At1 can be passed if and only if að1  At1Þ2c.
Since a að1  A^Þ2cð1  At1Þ2c, it follows that no policy A\At1 can be
passed.
Case 2 If At1 [ A^, the policy that passes if the standard-setter’s proposal fails is
no disclosure. It follows that the standard-setter can pass up to Amax ¼ a. This
implies that At ¼ minðA; aÞ: h
Proof of Corollary 4.1 Let EPðAtÞ be defined as the expected surplus conditional
on an implemented regulation At.
Table 1 Main notations
Notation Definition Comments
v Expected continuation cash flow
h Liquidation payoff
c Cost of disclosure
A Mandatory disclosure threshold Such that v\A Must be disclosed
At1 Status quo at date t
A Regulation preferred by standard-setter
Afb Regulation maximizing firm surplus
1  a Standard-setter’s political accountability Proposal fails if OppðA;At1Þ a
st Voluntary disclosure threshold v st is disclosed voluntarily
OppðA;At1Þ Total opposition to proposal A
NetðA;At1Þ Net support for proposal A Equals ‘‘supporters’’ minus ‘‘opposers’’
PopðAt1Þ Most popular regulation Maximizes NetðA;At1Þ
A^ Cycling bound on At1 i.e., PopðAt1Þ ¼ 1A A^At1
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maxðh; st  cÞdh
¼ ð1  2cÞ
Z 1
0
maxðh;Atð1  2cÞ þ cÞdh
¼ ð1  2cÞ 1
2
ððcþ Atð1  2cÞÞ2 þ 1Þ
¼  1
2
A2t ð1  2cÞ3  Atð1  2cÞ2c
1
2
ð1  2cÞðc2 þ 1Þ
¼  1
2





ð1At [ c  ð1  2cÞ2ð1 þ 4cÞÞ þ Atcð1  4cð2  3cÞ  1At [ ccÞ
þ 1
2
c2ð3 þ 1At[ c  8cÞ:
Case 1 Assume that c\1=4.
Consider At 2 ð0; cÞ. In this region, EP0ð:Þ is inverse U-shaped with:
EP0ð0Þ ¼ 1
2
c2ð3  8cÞ[ 0
EP0ðcÞ ¼ 2ð1  cÞ2c2ð1  4cÞ[ 0:
It follows that EP0ð:Þ[ 0 on ð0; cÞ, and therefore Afb c.
Consider next At 2 ½c; 1Þ. In this region, EP0ð:Þ is U-shaped with:
EP0ð1Þ ¼ 0
EP00ð1Þ ¼ 4ð1  cÞc2:
Note that At ¼ 1 satisfies the first-order condition for an optimum but is not the
desired solution, as EP00ð1Þ[ 0 implies that it is a local minimum.
As EP0ð:Þ is a quadratic U-shaped function, we know that EP0ð:Þ decreases then
increases on ðc; 1Þ, and therefore there is a unique solution in ðc; 1Þ that satisfies
EP0ðAfbÞ ¼ 0. Factorizing the polynomial EP0ð:Þ by observing that one of its roots is
At ¼ 1,
EP0ðAtÞ ¼ 2ð1  AtÞc2ð1  2c Atð3  4cÞÞ:
The second root (which is the only root that satisfies the second-order condition) is
then given by:
Afb ¼ 1  2c
3  4c :
Case 2 Assume that c 2 ½1=4; 3=8Þ.
Consider At 2 ð0; c. In this region, EP0ð:Þ is inverse U-shaped with:




c2ð3  8cÞ[ 0
EP0ðcÞ ¼ 2ð1  cÞ2c2ð1  4cÞ\0:
It follows that EP0ð:Þ has a unique root on ð0; cÞ, which satisfies the second-order
condition (i.e., EP00\0). Consider next At 2 ðc; 1Þ. In this region, r0ð:Þ is U-shaped
with (as before) EP0ð1Þ ¼ 0. It follows that EP0\0 for any At 2 ðc; 1Þ.
Therefore, the policy Afb is in ð0; cÞ and, solving EP0ðAfbÞ ¼ 0, is given by the
equation below.
Afb ¼ cð8c 3Þ
8c2  2c 1 :
Case 3 Assume that c 3=8.
EP0ð0Þ  EP0ðcÞ ¼ 1
2
c2ð1  2cÞð2cð7  4cÞ  1Þ[ 0
This implies that EP0\0 on At 2 ð0; cÞ. As in case 2, EP0\0 on ðc; 1Þ and Afb ¼ 0.
h
Proof of Proposition 4.2 The case with A  A^ is already explained in text so that
let us assume here that A[ A^. The forward-looking standard-setter will implement
At ¼ At1 þ a as long as At1 þ a A^ and, when k such that Ak1 þ a[ A^ is
reached, may either set Ak ¼ minðA;Ak1 þ aÞ (in which case the regulatory
dynamics will be identical to the baseline) or At ¼ A^ for any t k.
Define Ucycle as the surplus when the standard-setter chooses to cycle (first
option) and Ustab as the surplus when the standard-setter chooses to stabilize at A^
(second option). Let us define k as the duration of a cycle if the first option is
chosen, where [.] indicates the integer part.
A cycling policy visits states a; 2a; . . .; minðA;Ak1 þ aÞ and repeats, which
implies that:
Ucycle ¼ 1





In the equation above, the payoff obtained along one cycle UðminðA; akÞÞ þPk1
n¼1 b
nUðanÞ is repeated as a perpetuity with a discount rate bk given that each
cycle lasts for k periods.
On the other hand, stabilizing the policy at A^ implies a constant surplus
Ustab ¼ UðA^Þ
1  b :
It then follows that Ucycle\Ustab if and only if
798 J. Bertomeu, R. P. Magee
123





bn ðUðanÞ  UðA^ÞÞ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
\0
\0:
The function K is decreasing in b and in a. h
Appendix 2: Other disclosure regulations
This appendix proves two claims. First, all managers weakly prefer regulations in
which favorable events are not subject to mandatory disclosure (Lemma C.1).
Second, threshold regulations in which events v\A are subject to a mandatory
disclosure maximize popularity (Lemma C.4).
We generalize the notations and assumptions used in the baseline model to
describe non-interval type of disclosure rules. Define a standard as an indicator
function h: ½0; 1 ! f0; 1g such that hðvÞ ¼ 1 (resp., hðvÞ ¼ 0) indicates that the
event v is not subject to mandatory disclosure (resp., must be disclosed). The
voluntary disclosure threshold is denoted sh, and the non-disclosure price is denoted
PhðNDÞ.
Disclosing firms bear a cost c[ 0. Nondisclosers bear a cost c/ðPhðNDÞÞ 0




hðvÞdv is the gross non-disclosure price (exclud-
ing costs); /ð1Þ ¼ 1; and 0/0\1=c.15 As is well known, the voluntary disclosure
threshold satisfies the following equation:
PhðNDÞ  c/ðPhðNDÞÞ ¼ sh  c: ð8:1Þ
If there is more than one solution, we choose the highest solution because it is
Pareto dominant from the perspective of managers. Note that we parameterize the
cost in terms of the non-disclosure price that nests the baseline model (see footnote
13) and provides tractability to the model if the mandatory disclosure region fea-
tures multiple disjoint sets.
We restrict the attention to regulations in which NDh ¼ fv : hðvÞ ¼ 1; v shg is
empty or can be written as a finite union of closed intervals. The probability of non-
disclosure is denoted qh ¼ R sh
0
hðsÞds. In shorthand, denote hA for the function
hAðvÞ ¼ 1  1v\A (this is the baseline threshold regulation). With a slight abuse of
notation, we use PAðNDÞ instead of PhAðNDÞ and use this shorthand notation in
other places where hA would appear as a superscript. All statements are made up to
events with probability zero.
15 This functional form nests the baseline specification, setting /ðxÞ ¼ 1x c xc1c. The fact that /ð1Þ ¼ 1
guarantees that sh\1 is always interior for any h that does not prescribe full disclosure. The upper bound
/0\1=c guarantees that x /ðxÞ is increasing x, and thus more favorable expectations imply a higher
non-disclosure price, even net of costs. In reduced form, the specification captures the idea that standards
with higher non-disclosure price require greater degrees of mandatory disclosure to enforce (and might
require more verification as the payoff from misreporting is greater).
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Non-disclosure of favorable events
This section demonstrates several observations that are useful in proving the main
results.
Lemma C. 1 Let h1 be such that ND
h has a maximal nonempty interval ½x; y.
Then, a standard h2 such that ND
h2 ¼ NDh [ ½x; sh is weakly preferred by all
managers, strictly so by managers with v 2 ðy; sh.
Proof This follows from the following comparison between h1 and h2: (a) man-
agers with v 62 NDh2 are indifferent; (b) managers with v 2 ðy; sh (strictly) prefer h2
since they could have disclosed voluntarily; (c) managers with v 2 NDh1 prefer h2
because they obtain a higher non-disclosure price under h2. h
Lemma C.1 implies that we can restrict the attention to regulations in which
maxNDh ¼ sh. In particular, if NDh is an interval, it must have the threshold form
hA for some A.
Popularity of threshold regulations
As we solve the model by backward induction, we initially examine the second
phase of the regulatory game and derive the standard h that is the most popular
against an existing status quo hA.
We first establish two preliminary lemmas.
Lemma C. 2 Let there be two standards h and hA. If P
hðNDÞPAðNDÞ, then
qh sA  A (strictly if h 6¼ hA).






PhðNDÞ  c/ðPhðNDÞÞ ¼ sh  c ðlsÞ











Differentiating the Lagrangian L:
oL
oqh

















A standard hðvÞ ¼ 0 for all v cannot be a solution (it achieves qh ¼ 0\qA);
therefore lP\0. This function intersects zero at most once, from below, implying
that the solution has the form hA0 where, as q
A0 is decreasing in A0, implies that the
solution is hA.
Lemma C. 3 For any standard h 6¼ h0, qh\q0.
Proof If PhðNDÞ[P0ðNDÞ, this statement follows from Lemma C.2. If
PhðNDÞ ¼ P0ðNDÞ, sh ¼ s0, which implies that qh q0 ¼ s0 with equality if and
only if h ¼ h0. If PhðNDÞ\P0ðNDÞ, sh\s0, which also clearly implies qh\q0. h
As in the baseline model, denote the (net) popularity of a standard h over hA by
Netðh; hAÞ.
Lemma C. 4 For any A, h0 or hA maximizes popularity.
Proof Consider a regulation h in which NDh is composed of at least two disjoint
intervals. We need to show that Netðh; hAÞ maxðq0; qAÞ.
Case 1 Suppose that PhðNDÞPAðNDÞ. Lemma C.2 implies that qh\qA and
given that Netðh; hAÞ is bounded from above by qh (i.e., only nondisclosers under h
might prefer h), we know that Netðh; hAÞ qA.




hðvÞdv ðsA  AÞ
 minðA; s0Þ  ðsA  AÞ ¼ Netðh0; hAÞ ðby Lemma C.3Þ:
It then follows that the regulations h0 or hA maximize the function Netðh; hAÞ.16 h
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